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The U.S. economy is fundamentally sound.
Over the past few years, surveys of business
economists by the National Association for
Business Economics have regularly pointed to
key sources of strength. These include a dynamic
and flexible labor market and a financial system
that rewards innovation and risk-taking by chan-
neling capital to its highest rates of return. In
short, our market-based economy affords firms
the ability and the incentive to innovate and to
adapt quickly to changes in relative demands for
goods and services. Managements today respond
promptly to various shocks that rattle the econ-
omy. The growing dynamism of the U.S. economy
is nicely illustrated by the rise in the economy’s
rate of productivity growth that began around
1995—a change of enormous importance. It does
not yet appear that the current productivity
boom has run its course.
The rise in productivity growth has increased
the economy’s potential output growth. At present,
many economists estimate the potential growth
rate at between 3 and 3.5 percent. From mid-2003
to the beginning of 2006, the U.S. economy’s
actual real GDP growth was above the growth of
potential. Over this period, the economy’s growth
could exceed long-run potential because the
economy was recovering from the 2001 recession.
Given that the economy’s actual growth cannot
permanently exceed its potential growth, it was
inevitable that some slowing was to occur. And,
indeed, during the second and third quarters of
2006 real GDP growth averaged about 21/4 percent,
considerably less than the roughly 33/4 percent
growth experienced from the second quarter of
I
am pleased to be here today to discuss
the state of the U.S. economy and the
near-term outlook. Despite some variabili-
ty in quarterly growth rates last year, pri-
marily related to declines in housing invest-
ment, the state of our economy looks good. The
U.S. economy is highly productive, profit-making
opportunities abound, interest rates and inflation
are both relatively low and stable. The largest
challenge facing the United States is not the
business cycle but the task of adjusting on
many fronts to the retirement of the baby boom
generation. Fortunately, U.S. laws and institu-
tions will enable us to face these challenges with
a greater deal of optimism than in some other
countries that will face the demographic chal-
lenge sooner and in larger measure than we will.
As background for discussing the economic
outlook I’ll start by presenting a bird’s-eye view
of recent developments in the U.S. economy,
including those on the inflation front. Although
my main topic is prospects for the U.S. economy
over the next year or so, I do want to say a few
words about some of the economic implications
of long-run demographic change.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Kevin L. Kliesen, associate
economist in the Research Division, who pro-
vided special assistance. However, I retain full
responsibility for errors.2003 to the first quarter of 2006. As the growing
economy absorbed underutilized labor and capi-
tal resources, the Fed gradually raised its target
for the federal funds rate from 1 percent in 2004
to 51/4 percent in June of last year. The fed funds
target rate remains today at 51/4 percent.
Monetary policy actions kept inflation largely,
though not perfectly, in check and likely had
something to do with the timing of slower GDP
growth. I emphasize timing because slower GDP
growth was inevitable as the margin of underuti-
lized resources fell. As is so often the case, cer-
tain characteristics of the economic slowdown
had little or nothing to do with monetary policy.
Two other developments were important deter-
minants of the nature of the economy last year.
One was the sharp run-up in energy prices, which
began to be reversed in the middle of 2006. The
other was substantial weakness in housing mar-
kets, which may just now be showing very tenta-
tive signs of reaching bottom.
Three remarkable facts deserve attention.
First, real GDP growth, though sluggish in 2002,
has been robust since 2003, and the unemploy-
ment rate is now down to 4.6 percent. Second,
long-term inflation expectations have hardly
budged. Third, the quarterly average yield on
10-year nominal Treasury securities is actually
slightly lower today than it was in mid 2002.
The economy has performed well despite a near
tripling of crude oil prices since December 2001.
In years past, an energy price shock of this mag-
nitude was typically associated with a substantial
increase in inflation and a sharp recession.
Two things are different about energy price
increases this time. One is that the increases were
primarily a consequence of a booming world
economy, which raised energy demand rather
than a supply shock. Second, monetary policies
here and in most other countries have done a
fine job of anchoring inflation expectations.
The current housing slowdown, which is
much in the news, is unusual in that it has not
occurred against the backdrop of an economy-
wide recession, when especially large declines
in real residential fixed investment typically
occur. For example, real residential fixed invest-
ment declined by about 40 and 45 percent, respec-
tively, in the periods surrounding the 1973-75
and 1980-82 recessions.1 By contrast, real resi-
dential fixed investment has declined by about
13 percent since its peak in the third quarter of
2005.
Let me now turn to current economic devel-
opments in more detail, which will set the stage
for the outlook portion of my talk. As I step back
and survey the economic landscape, I see an
economy that appears to be transitioning quite
nicely from last year’s slow patch, to more sus-
tainable growth.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the past week or so we have seen a
dizzying array—though typical, I might add—of
economic reports. As usual, some were good and
some were so-so. As usual, we need to be aware
that first releases of data are often revised.
On balance, there seems to be a firmer tone
to the latest data. Particularly noteworthy was
the larger-than-expected increase in real GDP
during the fourth quarter of 2006. Following rel-
atively anemic rates of growth in the second and
third quarters of 2006, growth of real GDP during
the fourth quarter picked up nicely, rising to a
3.5 percent annual rate.
Keep in mind, though, that this estimate is
the first for the fourth quarter and subject to revi-
sion. Measuring GDP growth over the four quar-
ters of the year, real GDP increased by more than
3 percent for the fourth straight year. A closer
look at the GDP report reveals that two areas of
strength were real consumer outlays and foreign
purchases of U.S. goods and services. To some
extent, the former reflects the decline in energy
prices that began in the middle of last year, which
has restored some of the purchasing power that
was lost when gasoline prices rose well above $3
per gallon in many parts of the country. The latter
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1 These two periods are 1973:Q1 to 1975:Q1 and 1978:Q3 to 1982:Q3. The latter period encompasses the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions.probably reflects the improving growth prospects
for the rest of the world. Another striking aspect
of the report was the 4.2 percent growth in real
final sales. Hence, despite a modest downturn
in inventory investment, which nevertheless
remained positive, real GDP growth was quite
strong.
Two other aspects of the GDP report were
less favorable than the overall report. First, busi-
ness fixed investment posted a slight decline in
the fourth quarter. I suspect that the decline was
nothing more than normal variation, perhaps a
consequence in part of firms waiting for release
of the new Vista operating system from Microsoft.
Over the four quarters of 2006, nonresidential
fixed investment rose by 6.8 percent, a healthy
and expected increase given that the economy
has continued to absorb excess capacity. At this
point, forecasts still point to a healthy pace of
growth in business capital outlays this year—
and perhaps the better-than-expected increase in
December factory orders is a reflection of this
expected growth. Nonetheless, extension of the
fourth quarter weakness in business capital out-
lays going forward certainly would be a cause
for concern.
The second aspect of the GDP report that gar-
nered a lot of attention was the nearly 20 percent
rate of decline in residential fixed investment.
The decline began in the second quarter and the
pace of decline picked up in each subsequent
quarter. Naturally, the sharp decline in private
housing starts and sales imparted a significant
drag on real GDP growth last year. During the
second half of 2006, the contribution to real GDP
growth from real residential fixed investment
averaged about –11/4 percentage points.
Last year was a difficult environment for
homebuilders. It was also difficult for some
homeowners in those parts of the country where
the pace of home price appreciation slowed to a
standstill. I’ll focus on new single-family homes,
since that is the dominant part of the new-home
market; the number of multi-family units started
has remained relatively constant since 1997, at
about 340,000 units per year.
Following a record-setting rate of 1.7 million
units started in 2005, single-family starts fell to
1.5 million units in 2006. This average, though,
reflected a relatively large number of starts during
the first half of the year and then a much lower
level of starts during the second half of 2006. By
December 2006, single-family starts were roughly
16.5 percent below their annual average.
In 2006, new home sales fell about 171/4 per-
cent to a little more than 1 million units and
builders soon found themselves facing an accu-
mulation of unsold homes. As a result, invento-
ries of new homes rose sharply relative to sales,
and in July 2006 the inventory-sales ratio reached
its highest level in more than 10 years.
In response, builders naturally began to
reduce new construction. Part of this pullback
was motivated by skittish households; cancella-
tion rates, according to some large builders,
reached 40 percent or more during the latter part
of 2006. Although the majority of forecasters
correctly anticipated softness in housing con-
struction, the magnitude of the decline exceeded
their expectations. In December 2005, the con-
sensus of the Blue Chip forecasters was that real
residential fixed investment would decline by
only about 1.4 percent in 2006, using annual
average data. Instead, the decline was about 41/4
percent, but was considerably steeper—more than
12.5 percent— measured from the fourth quarter
of 2005 to the fourth quarter of 2006.
By some indicators, the housing market is
beginning to show signs of stabilizing. New single-
family home sales rose in December, the fourth
increase in the past five months, while in January
the National Association of Home Builders’ hous-
ing market index—a measure of builder confi-
dence—rose to its highest level since July 2006.
Further, the four-week moving average of the
Mortgage Bankers Association index of applica-
tions for home purchases has increased nicely
since its trough last October. Finally, the University
of Michigan’s consumer survey of home-buying
conditions in January 2007 reportedly rose to its
highest level since mid-2005.
The market for previously sold single-family
homes may also have stabilized. Existing home
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quarter of 2006, after declining 6.4 percent in the
third quarter. Moreover, the pending home sales
index reported by the National Association of
Realtors turned up in January, registering its largest
monthly increase since March 2004. Although
the inventory of existing homes for sale, relative
to sales, has also dropped over the past few
months, its December level of 6.5 was still a bit
above that for new homes, which stood at 5.9.
While recent data seem to point in a favorable
direction, we must recognize that the housing mar-
ket is not out of the woods yet. The most pressing
issue for builders remains the backlog of unsold
homes, at which they are chipping away, and the
continued high rates of canceled orders.
A special word of caution is in order con-
cerning housing data. Starts and permits data are
routinely affected by weather variations, espe-
cially in the winter. To an unusual degree, sales
data are affected by cancellations, which occur
when buyers walk away from sales contracts. In
published data, cancelled sales are not subtracted
from new sales to create a net sales series. More-
over, cancelled sales are not put back into the
data on the inventory of unsold new homes.
Anecdotal reports clearly indicate that cancella-
tions have been material. Thus, official data over-
state net sales of new homes and understate the
inventory of unsold homes. Finally, favorable
recent news on the inventory of existing homes
for sale may well have been influenced by dis-
couraged homeowners taking their properties off
the market rather than by actual sales.
House price data are also subject to distor-
tions. For existing homes, the median sales price
data released by the National Association of
Realtors (NAR) show a decline starting in August
and continuing every month except for a solid
recovery in December. However, median price
data can be distorted by a changing mix of sales.
Fewer sales of high-end homes will reduce the
median. Data released by the Office of Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) are not subject to
this problem, but only cover homes financed by
conforming mortgages, which are currently capped
at $417,000. Although a changing mix of homes
sold is not a problem with this series, high-end
homes are excluded altogether. The OFHEO home
price series derived from mortgage data for newly
purchased homes shows an annual rate of price
change of only about 1.5 percent in the third
quarter of 2006, the latest data available as of
this time.
To avoid the statistical limitations of the NAR
and OFHEO price data, we can turn to the Case-
Shiller price series for 20 cities, available through
November 2006. The 20-city composite series
shows declines for both October and November;
in November, the series was only 1.7 percent above
itsprioryearlevel.Moreover,theNovember
declinefrom October occurred in 17 of the 20
cities.
My summary conclusion on home prices is
that we have evidence of pervasive weakness
last year. It remains to be seen what this year will
bring, but at a minimum we can say that we do
not have evidence as yet that home prices have
stabilized.
For forecasters and policymakers, a key
unknown is the long-run sustainable level of
housing starts going forward. If the recent rate of
starts has been above this sustainable rate, then
we would expect to see an extended period of
slower-than-normal activity until the inventory
bulge is worked off. By the same token, if starts
have fallen to a level that is below their sustain-
able rate, then we can expect that the inventory
bulge will be worked off this year, so that the
level starts will return to their normal rate some-
time later this year.
Statistically, there are several ways to estimate
the normal level of starts. A common method is
to estimate a model of some sort. For our pur-
poses, assume that single-family housing starts
in any year is a function of three primary vari-
ables: interest rates, household income and demo-
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2 The model specifies the log-level of single-family starts as a function of the level of the 10-year Treasury yield, the log-level of households
and the log-level of real GDP. The model is an ARMA specification of AR (1) and MA (2). The model uses annual data, 1965 to 2006. Further
details are available on request.graphics.2 In 2006, a model of this sort projected
that housing starts would total about 1.7 million
units, about 12.5 percent more than the actual
level of about 1.5 million units. Assume: 1) no
change in the average level of interest rates this
year (relative to 2006); 2) that real GDP increases
by 3 percent this year; and 3) that the number of
households increases by 1 percent. With these
assumptions, the model predicts that single-
family housing starts will total about 1.4 million
units this year, which we can compare to the
actual 1.5 million units in 2006. This projection
for 2007, which would be a 2.5 percent decline
from 2006’s average, appears to be at the high-end
of most forecasters’ expectation, perhaps because
the model just outlined makes no allowance for
the overhang of excessive inventory at the begin-
ning of this year. But, eventually, as the inventory
is worked off, home-building activity should pick
up substantially from the 2006 year-end level of
about 1.2 million units at an annual rate.
Some economists have worried that a poten-
tial side effect from the housing recession would
be to drag down consumer spending more gener-
ally as home prices leveled off. Yet, as the fourth-
quarter GDP report revealed, real consumer
outlays appear to be holding up well.
The strength of consumer outlays is surely
due to a sustained healthy labor market outlook,
which we can expect to help keep consumer
spending on a solid footing this year. Although
last week’s employment report showed that job
gains in January were a bit below expectations,
job gains over the previous months were revised
substantially higher as a result of the annual
benchmark revision to the establishment survey
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Accord-
ing to the BLS, nonagricultural payroll employ-
ment in the benchmark month—March 2006—was
revised up by 752,000, an unusually large revision.
Average monthly job gains from March 2006 to
December 2006 were also boosted, from their
original estimate of 148,000 per month to 174,000
per month.
Data revisions are one of the numerous
sources of uncertainties that face monetary poli-
cymakers. The reason is that our current policies
are always calibrated to the data that present
themselves to us today—in real-time—and how
the data map into the near-term outlook for eco-
nomic activity and inflation. There is always the
risk that our current policy can inadvertently be
either be too restrictive or too stimulative. That’s
part of the challenge of making monetary policy.
As I think you can see from my earlier remarks,
we dig deeply into the data and our inferences
from what we observe are not always in accord
with a surface reading of the data.
RECENT INFLATION
DEVELOPMENTS
I’ll now discuss recent developments on the
inflation front. Last year’s CPI inflation news was
somewhat peculiar in that, over the 12 months
ending December 2006, inflation measured by
the all-items CPI—sometimes called “headline
inflation”—declined but core inflation, which
excludes food and energy prices, rose slightly.
Headline CPI inflation slowed from 3.4 percent
in 2005 to 2.6 percent in 2006, while the infla-
tion rate measured by the PCE price index rose
slowed from 2.9 percent to 2.3 percent over the
same period.
The moderation of headline inflation is
undoubtedly a reflection of the sharp decline in
energy prices over the second half of 2006. Most
economists believe that core inflation is a better
measure of inflation pressures. The core PCE price
index rose slightly from 2.1 percent in 2005 to
2.2 percent in 2006 and the core CPI index rose
even more, from 2.2 to 2.6 percent.3 Fortunately,
core price pressures have eased of late: The three-
month rate of change in the core PCE was 1.7
percent, while the six-month rate of change was
1.9 percent. Clearly, the momentum seems to be
headed in a favorable direction, as last week’s
FOMC press release noted.
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3 Inflation is measured as the percent change, December to December.But before we declare victory and head home,
it’s wise to consider some of the upside risks that
I worry about. One of these risks, as I’ve noted
earlier, is the possibility that we might be under-
estimating the likely pace of economic activity.
If we get an upside surprise on GDP growth, then
monetary policy may have to be tightened some-
what.
Another risk is that labor productivity growth
might be lower than currently expected. Data
released just two days ago indicate that in 2006
the annual average increase in productivity in
the nonfarm business sector was 2.1 percent,
down slightly from the increase of 2.3 percent in
2005 and down substantially from the average
rate of 3.2 percent for 2000-2004. Given that the
economy’s potential growth depends on trend
growth in productivity and in the labor force, we
will have to watch trends in both of these closely
in the years ahead.
THINKING ABOUT THE
OUTLOOK
In its policy statement issued after the meeting
last week, the FOMC noted that the economy
seems likely to expand at a moderate pace over
coming quarters. My own take on what “moderate
pace” means is that real GDP is likely to increase
by roughly 3 percent over the four quarters of
this year—particularly if the housing market is
near an inflection point and no longer a signifi-
cant drag on growth. But I want to emphasize that
fluctuations in growth are normal and that no
policy action is necessarily indicated if growth
comes in somewhat above or below that outlook.
When data come in outside the range expected,
we need to understand the reasons and the like-
lihood that the departure will be sustained unless
there is an offsetting policy response. Only then
does it make sense to consider a policy response.
Regarding the outlook for inflation, I’ve said
for quite some time that it might take a while for
underlying price pressures to recede. Recent
inflation data themselves, and other information
relevant to judging the inflation outlook, suggest
that the inflation rate is likely to fall into a reason-
able range this year. If, however, core inflation
seems to be settling at a rate above 2 percent, then
such an outcome would be unacceptable to me. I
put a very high weight on the Fed’s responsibility
to maintain low and stable inflation.
At some point we’ll almost certainly see some
surprises in the data. Long experience with eco-
nomic forecasts indicates that we need to consider
as a standard feature of the environment GDP
forecast errors in the neighborhood of 11/2 per-
centage points on a four-quarter-ahead horizon.
Thus, a forecast of 3 percent GDP growth should
be expressed as 3 percent plus or minus 11/2 per-
cent. From experience, an outcome in this range
has a probability of about two-thirds. The other
one-third probability is divided equally above
and below the range. Thus, the probability of an
outcome significantly different from the baseline
forecast is not small. The FOMC is prepared to
respond when the outcome promises to depart
from the baseline in a sustained way.
Although incoming data will at some point
surprise us, what should not be surprising is the
Fed’s commitment to maintaining price stability.
Inflation forecasts over the next four quarters
are also subject to standard errors. Over a longer
horizon, though, the inflation issue is not one of
forecast errors but of policy commitment and
policy errors. My commitment, certainly, is to do
what I can to promote policy adjustments that will
yield an inflation outcome, on average over a
period of several years, centered on 11/2 percent
on the core PCE price index. Such an outcome
will ensure that the FOMC maintains its current
high level of credibility. Maintaining price stabil-
ity is central to maximizing sustainable economic
growth and the highest possible level of employ-
ment. Stable inflation also contributes greatly to
the economy’s ability to adjust successfully to
inevitable shocks. That has been the Fed’s mes-
sage—and its stated policy—for many years. It
has been a successful strategy.
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In an outlook speech, I cannot skip the oppor-
tunity to discuss briefly the economic implica-
tions of the changing demographic situation in
the United States and the rest of the world.
Demands on government from our aging popula-
tion center on, but are not confined to, financ-
ing this country’s two primary programs for the
elderly—Social Security and Medicare. Chairman
Bernanke recently testified before the U.S.
Congress on this matter.4
The macroeconomic implications of demo-
graphic change are significant. The retirement
of the baby boomers is expected to reduce the
economy’s labor force participation rate dramati-
cally. The participation rate is the percentage of
persons age 16 and over in the labor force, either
working or seeking work. Declining growth in the
labor force has important implications for our
long-run, sustainable growth of GDP.
In its latest Budget and Economic Outlook,
the Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the average annual growth of potential output
from 1950 to 2006 was 3.4 percent. The 3.4 per-
cent is divided between labor productivity growth
of 1.8 percentage points and labor force growth
of 1.6 percentage points. Over the next 10 years,
the CBO expects these contributions to change
dramatically. From 2007 to 2017, the CBO projects
that productivity will increase by an average of 2
percent per year; however, owing to the gradual
declines in the labor force participation rate, the
growth of the labor force is projected to increase
by an average of only 0.7 percent per year. Hence,
the CBO projects the growth of the economy’s
potential output will slow by about 0.75 percent-
age points in the coming decade to a little more
than 2.5 percent. This projection, if accurate, has
serious long-term implications.
In a previous speech, I discussed the possibil-
ity that participation rates among older workers
might rise modestly in the coming years. If that
happens, labor force growth will not slow as rap-
idly as some projections indicate because more
people over age 65 will be continuing to work
than past retirement patterns would lead us to
expect.5 But the demographics tell us that such
an outcome only delays inevitable adjustment. It
could be that more of those in the 65-69 age group
might work than has been the case recently, but
when those same persons become the 75-79 age
group we can be pretty sure that most will be
retired. Because labor represents the largest single
input in U.S. production, GDP will eventually
begin to exhibit a slower rate of growth unless
there is an offsetting increase in the economy’s
structural rate of productivity growth.6 Because
income for the country as a whole depends on
production, slower growth in GDP and income
implies slower growth in consumption of U.S.
households.
The likely result is that, all else equal, a
decrease in labor supply growth will lead to
slower growth in our economic well-being. Since
monetary policy can affect only prices and not
quantities in the long run, the Fed cannot alter
this situation.
My discussion of the macroeconomic outlook
may seem somewhat abstract, as is unavoidably
the case when discussing a GDP of $11.422 tril-
lion. That is a larger number than I can compre-
hend. Slower growth in this number is also hard to
make real to us as individuals. The demographic
challenge, however, will be felt by every firm in
the economy. I know that we at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis are acutely aware of
the significant number of employees retiring
over the next decade. Those retiring employees
are our little piece of the nation’s demographic
challenge. My confidence in the United States
meeting the challenge reflects my confidence in
the nation’s decentralized market system. Indi-
vidual firms will adjust, by persuading some
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4 See Bernanke (2007).
5 See Poole (2006).
6 Of course, this assumes that immigration rates or changes in fertility rates do not materially alter the projected growth of potential labor force.employees to retire later, by moving younger
employees more quickly into positions of respon-
sibility and by substituting capital for labor. The
challenge for governments will be more difficult,
because political decisions are not reached as
easily as decisions in individual firms. Still, if
we approach the political issues with full under-
standing of the fundamentals of the demographics
and with the spirit of compromise that charac-
terizes our democracy, I am confident that we’ll
come out the other side of the demographic tran-
sition in fine shape.
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